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Abstract 
The paper describes the formation of the Durban Auto Cluster in the context 
of trade liberalization. It argues that the improvement of operational 
competitiveness of firms in the cluster is prominently due to joint action. It 
tests this proposition by comparing the gains from cluster activities in the 
areas of supplier development, human resource development, logistics, and 
benchmarking, and by contrasting the impact of joint action against a host of 
other variables, notably international competition and technical assistance by 
foreign partners. 
Introduction 
Our tale begins as follows: Once upon a time, in far-away lands where the lion and 
the bushbuck meet, there was a bunch of automotive component suppliers. A high 
wall fenced off their territory against foreign marauders, and the bunch gaily went 
about their business of manufacturing substandard parts for vehicles produced in 
such small batches that consumers in this strange nation paid among the highest 
prices in the world for their cars. One day our suppliers woke up and to their 
astonishment realised that the wall was gone. Worse, before they could finish 
breakfast, heavily ekwippt suppliers and kar assemblers schpeeking with strange 
akzents had taken over half zee nations territory. Word on the street was that fifth 
columns in the country had helped the outside forces prepare their assault. The future 
looked dim for our terrified and demoralized bunch! And the end goes like this:  
and thus, our bunch lived happily ever after, sort of. 
The tale's missing mid-section requires some elaboration. Section 2 offers a 
brief primer on the anatomy, internal dynamics, and evolution of clusters. 
Section 3 describes the historical evolution of the Durban Automotive Cluster 
(DAC) in the context of the impact of aggressive trade liberalization and 
expanding global automotive supply chains on the South African automobile 
industry. Section 4 is the analytical core of the chapter. It first presents our 
data and lays out our methodology. It then discusses the performance of the 
cluster over time, benchmarked against international competitors. Next, it 
develops a composite cooperation index to measure joint action, a key 
hypothesized determinant of cluster performance. Finally, it verifies the 
reasons behind the growth of the cluster through a survey of its members. 
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Section 5 concludes with some remarks about the significance of our tale for 
both understanding and influencing cluster development in an advanced 
latecomer economy. 
 
A brief primer on the anatomy, internal dynamics, and evolution of clusters 
How do we know a cluster when we see one? Invariably the answer to this 
question depends on the definition of the phenomenon. If any set of 
industries where buyers and suppliers interact or where participant firms 
share common technologies, buyers, or distribution channels, or where they 
make use of the same labour pool, constitutes a cluster, the world must be full 
of them.i If we impose the additional condition for these firms to be in the 
same location, the world-wide cluster head count is clearly lower.ii However 
what has given rise to cluster analysis, both historically and in the present 
age, is not so much the existence of inter-firm relationships or geographical 
concentration per se but rather the effects on economic performance these two 
characteristics allegedly give rise to. In short, a firm that can count on the 
ready availability of a pool of skilled labour and intermediate goods suppliers 
and that operates in an environment rife with new ideas  about products, 
technologies, or organization  is likely to be more efficient than a firm 
located all by itself on the moon. This is true even in a globalised economy 
because much technology is so complex, specific, and cumulative in its 
development that it defies codification and transmission.iii Thus, when 
aggregating across all participant firms, the presence of externalities sees to it 
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that a cluster is more than the sum of its parts or, more precisely, its static and 
dynamic efficiency is superior to what its participant firms would achieve 
outside the cluster context. 
 Another reason commonly given for superior cluster performance is that it 
makes sense for firms in a cluster to cooperate with and to compete against 
each other more so than if they were dispersed. For example, close proximity 
allows the setting up of common training schemes. Conversely, the presence 
of local competitors spurns greater competition because compared to far-
away producers it manifests a very visible threat.iv In knowledge-intensive 
industries, much is made of the import of inter-firm learning for technological 
upgrading and innovation. Work commissioned by the OECD suggests that 
clusters have the potential to remove the imperfections with respect to the 
production and use of knowledge inherent in international production 
networks or national innovation systems, thanks to the strong 
interdependencies between firms they create and exploit.v
 Similarly, in developing countries where the prevalence of small 
manufacturing firms often constitutes a hindrance to exploiting market 
opportunities, achieving economies of scale in input purchases, and 
internalizing many of the functions that drive firm dynamism, networking  
which is easier in clusters  can help firms enhance their competitiveness.vi 
For example, the extent, depth, and effectiveness of the adoption of 
international best practices explain a good deal about why some firms 
manage to rise to the challenge of the southward expansion of global supply 
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chains that require just-in-time (JIT) production and total quality management 
(TQM), while others do not.  Next to the impact of relative integration into 
supply chains, it is again the interaction between the capabilities of firms, in 
addition to their response to competitive opportunities, that influences their 
growth. In short, for a number of reasons industrial reorganization of 
developing-country firms may be more feasible from within a cluster.vii
 In practical terms a firm may be able to exploit spillovers in joint ventures 
or from subsidiaries of multinational firms (MNEs) with which they are not 
co-located. Hence agglomeration is not a necessary condition for externalities 
to materialize. An interesting question is what happens when the strategies of 
MNEs and local firms intersect inside a cluster that yields outcomes beyond 
those traditionally associated with host-country effects of foreign direct 
investment (FDI).viii This is an emerging field of enquiry that warrants further 
research.ix On balance, theory and empirical evidence so far suggest that it is 
very difficult to capture knowledge from an MNE without having to pay for 
it, and thus easier to assimilate and adapt information from firms in 
geographical proximity with which one is in everyday contact.x Herein lies 
the attraction of the cluster concept both for developed and developing 
countries.  
But it is sometimes forgotten that agglomeration by itself is also not a 
sufficient condition to stimulate externalities. Like two grumpy old men 
sitting on a park bench without talking to each other, a cluster without 
externalities is at best an opportunity forgone, without the trappings of an 
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interesting story. What would be an attractive story is seeing the two 
gentlemen all of a sudden engaged in a friendly and animated conversation, 
especially if one were able to understand what made them change their ways. 
In more formal language, the reduction of cluster dynamics to externalities  
which by definition are involuntary and incidental  flies in the face of 
empirical evidence of what makes clusters tick the world over. The missing 
element is consciously pursued joint action mainly by firms, on occasion 
assisted by public-sector organizations and dedicated service providers. In 
other words, successful clusters develop partly because of human agency 
behind a wide range of forms of business cooperation. Put simply, 
externalities and joint action are the source of competitive advantage; Schmitz 
has termed this collective efficiency.xi
 The collective-efficiency framework helps explain the evolution of clusters. 
It makes sense to view cluster strength as the ability to respond to (adverse) 
changes in the environment, rather than as just a static attribute of however 
defined success. Clusters may have life cycles that are related to but not 
synonymous with the cycle of their key technologies. For example, congestion 
may impede further growth of a cluster literally choking on its own success. 
This then poses the problem for participant firms how to revive the cluster 
and how to avoid various kinds of potentially fatal lock-ins.xii Similarly, 
technological innovation or an external shock such as an increase in 
competition induced by trade liberalization may threaten the viability of a 
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cluster unless its firms understand, and react to, the change in relative prices 
caused by either event. 
 OECD governments generally view clusters positively, especially those that 
are highly innovative, and have created support structures aimed at 
catalyzing knowledge exchange between key cluster actors.xiii But with the 
exception of dedicated science parks, networking in most existing clusters in 
advanced economies emerged more or less spontaneously. This is less 
common in developing countries. Firms shy away from the high transaction 
costs associated with identifying suitable partners, especially when supply 
relations are weak; suffer from market imperfections with respect to the 
provision of information and innovation without which clusters are unlikely 
to prosper; rarely benefit from effective sector organizations while having to 
put up with profuse lobbying activity; struggle with all kinds of decrepit 
infrastructure; and do not have the means to police free riding in the context 
of a relatively underdeveloped legal framework.xiv
This brings external agents to the fore that reduce the weight of these 
factors and catalyse inter-firm communication. They include specialized 
business services that provide market research as well as intelligence on 
regulatory regimes, standards, product testing, and the like. They also include 
government agencies  insofar as they are technically capable and not 
principally intent on rent-seeking themselves  from local to regional and 
national level. In view of the role of governments, the interesting question is 
perhaps not so much how they can influence the creation of clusters as which 
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policies promote cluster development. For example, public authorities might 
be able to address cluster deficiencies  in terms of providing physical or 
knowledge infrastructure or attracting key technologies through inward 
direct investment  that participant firms by themselves cannot solve. 
 While it is possible, in theory, to direct development policy to clusters so 
that firms capture externalities that would otherwise not be available, the 
reality of policymaking is much messier. One-size-fits-all approaches do not 
work. Successful interventions presume a thorough understanding of the 
nature of the benefits that emanate from specific instances of co-location; how 
these benefits can be married to equally idiosyncratic location-specific 
advantages; and which policy measures are best suited to making the match 
happen.xv
 So the answer to the question posed at the beginning of this section is that 
we recognize a cluster because the agglomeration of firms it represents 
exhibits at some point in time a strength that would be unattainable by the 
same firms in dispersion. This strength is due to agglomeration economies 
and to joint action, namely the concerted efforts of cluster participants to 
translate market opportunities and challenges into competitive potential by 
leveraging inter-firm cooperation. In the context of developing countries, this 
may require the involvement of public authorities or dedicated service 
providers to overcome market imperfections. While cluster is a 
geographically bounded concept, its knowledge infrastructure may well be 
open to information from beyond its boundaries. This underlines the potential 
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significance of outside technology, especially in the context of global supply 
chains. Finally, clusters are a path-dependent phenomenon. How a cluster 
fares today has to do with its evolution over time and also bears some 
relevance for how it is going to perform in the future. Weak clusters may gain 
in strength, and clusters once successful may eventually fail. Fortunately, this 
chapter is inspired by a story that belongs in the former category. 
 
From import substitution to global value chains: the automotive industry in 
KwaZulu-Natal 
The principal purpose of this section is to describe what happened, rather than 
why. A considerable body of work on clusters is guilty of giving extremely 
detailed accounts of specific instances of agglomeration without showing the 
relative weight of the multitude of variables employed to explain their 
growth. Description subsequently substitutes for analysis and stands in the 
way of theoretical understanding instead of helping to advance it. The 
historical account that follows is uncontroversial. But our contention that the 
elevation of a mere agglomeration to a vibrant cluster was critically due to 
joint action, may well not be. That is why we construct this argument more 
carefully in Section 4. 
This section outlines the evolution of the South African automobile sector 
with particular emphasis on the policy environment. It shows how the rapidly 
changing competitive environment since the early 1990s impacted on 
automotive supplier firms based in the KwaZulu-Natal Province (KZN). It 
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examines how these firms adjusted to the changes which provides the context 
for the formation of the Durban Automotive Cluster. 
 The South African automobile-related sector is relatively insignificant 
compared to total global automotive production but it has for many decades 
captured the attention of policy makers in the country.xvi In this context South 
Africa made considerable efforts in the post-World-War-II era, through a 
variety of government interventions, to create the conditions for the 
development of a solid automobile manufacturing presence. The involvement 
of state entities in concessional financing regimes, the presence of subsidised 
state enterprises in the defence industry, the imposition of import quotas and 
tariffs, and the repression of labour unions all played their part in the 
development of a sector that supplied, almost exclusively and in a highly 
protected manner, the domestic market.  This policy regime was part of an 
industrial development framework based on import substitution that was 
central to apartheid-era economic policy.xvii It was reinforced in the last 
quarter of the twentieth century as the apartheid regime began to suffer the 
effects of international isolation and sanctions and reacted with a growing 
obsession with national self-sufficiency in strategic market areas.xviii
Automotive (and other) firms operated at levels of productivity, quality and 
innovation well below international best practice.xix For a relatively small 
passenger and commercial vehicle market there was a proliferation of 
domestically manufactured model varieties, produced and sold at costs well 
above those in more liberalised markets. In this sense South Africa up until 
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the early 1990s resembled the Mexico of the 1970s. Component firms 
supplying into this market were characterised by low volumes and short-run 
production cycles. It is no wonder then that benchmarking exercises showed 
them to be some way off both competitive pricing and international 
operational standards.xx
The political changes of the early 1990s also heralded a new era of economic 
policies. In line with multilateral orthodoxies of the time, the country 
embraced an accelerated trade liberalization programme and began 
systematically to remove demand-oriented industrial policies. Within a 
relatively short period the government abolished quotas and agreed to tariff 
adjustments in the Uruguay Round of GATT. Duty levels on completely built 
up vehicles (CBUs) fell from 115 per cent in 1995 to 40 per cent in 2002 and are 
scheduled to reach 25 per cent by 2012. Tariffs on completely knocked down 
components (CKDs) are lower yet. However, despite an unambiguous 
commitment to trade liberalization in general, the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) also pursued a policy agenda specific to the automobile sector. 
It did so in an effort to manage a shift towards greater export orientation. 
Policy makers did not want to run the risk of deindustrialization  with 
disastrous effects on export prospects  that they knew global competition 
had rained on more or less unsuspecting emerging markets elsewhere. In 1995 
this motivation led to the Motor Industry Development Programme (MIDP). 
The objective behind the initial form of the MIDP was to secure the 
investment commitment of the major original equipment manufacturers 
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(OEMs) with an existing manufacturing presence in South Africa. The MIDP 
was largely negotiated with these key role players, and the government 
pursued it despite concerns from trading partners that it contravened WTO 
commitments. The MIDP sought to encourage the domestic-based OEMs to 
reduce the range of models produced domestically. To this end it allowed the 
OEMs to earn import credits by expanding exports of the reduced range of 
models with significant local content. Thanks to the so-called Import Rebate 
Credit Certificates (IRCCs) OEMs could thus bring in a fuller range of vehicles 
from other plants around the world for sale in South Africa at a reduced duty 
level. VW, BMW and Daimler (later DaimlerChrysler) were the first to 
respond by injecting significant capital into their South African operations for 
the production of a limited range of vehicles, the bulk of which would be 
destined for export markets. Responses by other OEMs were slower, in part 
because of more complicated ownership arrangements where international 
brands were being produced under license by domestic firms. But soon all 
major OEMs signed up. The impact of this set of arrangements on South 
African vehicle output and exports was significant (see Figure 1). Exports 
have grown substantially since 1995, and between 1998 and 2002, when early 
OEM investments had realised production potential, unit exports rose 383.9 
per cent.xxi Import levels have also grown under the more liberal trade 
arrangements. Imported units made up 23.1 per cent of total domestic sales in 
2002 compared to 6.5 per cent in 1995. 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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 The MIDP, together with the depreciation of the Rand from the mid-1990s, 
turned South Africa into a relatively competitive producer of both 
components and completed vehicles. The contribution of the auto sector to 
total manufacturing sales grew from 9.7 per cent in 1994 to 12.8 per cent in 
2003. Component sales during this period also grew from around R6 billion in 
1994 to almost R15 billion in 2000. The performance of the component firms 
during the 1990s was largely driven by the MIDP. Prominent exports were, 
for example, catalytic converters and leather seat covers.  However, the 
growth in capacity utilisation demanded by these changes and the 
increasingly stringent requirements on suppliers joining global supply chains 
placed considerable pressure on these firms. Local industry consolidated and 
subsidiaries of multinational component manufacturers entered the country. 
Stagnant domestic demand exacerbated the competitive pressure. Insofar as 
the initial design of the MIDP focused on the OEMs, the policy environment 
was less conducive to facilitating the adaptation of component firms. But 
subsequent adjustments to the MIDP addressed this shortcoming to avoid a 
hollowing out of the manufacturing base in which South Africa would merely 
be an assembly location. Figure 2 shows that the rate of growth of component 
output increased after 1999. 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
The overall impact of these policies was in line with expectations. 
Production for export of vehicles has increased considerably since the late 
1990s, and global OEMs expanded investments in their SA-based plants. 
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However, the period has also witnessed much greater import penetration, 
with firms taking advantage of the possibility to exchange credits earned from 
exports with local content for imported models and components. 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
It was this changing environment that confronted firms in the KwaZulu-
Natal region. KZN is the countrys third centre in the hierarchy of automotive 
sector activity (see Figure 3). The Gauteng area around Pretoria and 
Johannesburg is both the largest market and has the largest concentration of 
OEMs (BMW, Ford, Nissan, Fiat) and component firms. The Eastern Cape, 
with its three major OEMs (DaimlerChrysler in East London, VW in Port 
Elizabeth, and Delta Motor Corporation in Uitenhage) is the next most 
significant car manufacturing centre. Production activity in KZN is 
dominated by the Toyota plant which had for many years been the operation 
with the most significant domestic output. Although many component firms 
also supplied  other OEMs in the country, traditionally Toyota was their most 
important customer. The Toyota plant used a mixture of first tier supplies 
from in-house operations and local component firms, and imported the rest. 
Most automotive firms based in KZN, including Toyota, are based in or 
around Durban. Pietermaritzburg, the provincial capital, hosts the second 
most numerous contingent. These firms are closely integrated with supply 
and logistics activities in Durban some 90 km away. The firms in Ladysmith, 
Stanger, and Richards Bay rely less or not at all on sourcing arrangements 
generated in Durban directly or indirectly by Toyota. Ten firms in KZN are 
 13
first tier suppliers, 20 are second or third tier, ten supply the aftermarket, and 
a dozen more marginal firms straddle the latter categories  (ibid, 15). Figure 4 
shows their product profile. Some second and third tier suppliers are not 
exclusive auto component firms and produce for other sectors but count the 
auto sector as a significant customer. 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
The performance of these firms during the period of adjustment has been 
highly uneven. Toyota, which until early 2002 operated in South Africa under 
licence from Toyota Manufacturing Corporation of Japan, initially failed to 
respond to the changing trade environment fostered by the MIDP. License 
conditions imposed major limits on exporting and the firm continued to focus 
on producing a range of vehicles for the domestic market. However, in view 
of contracting global markets Toyota Japan sought more competitive 
platforms worldwide, and the attractive package on offer through the MIDP 
led it to take a majority stake in the Durban-based operations. The plants in 
KZN subsequently moved rapidly toward greater specialisation in production 
and improving performance levels in order to secure export contracts into 
Toyotas global supply system. At present Toyota exports the Toyota RunX to 
Australasia and is in the process of meeting requirements to export new 
generation Corolla and Hilux models to a range of markets, most notably the 
European Union. Toyota has also managed to retain a quarter of the domestic 
market which makes it the dominant assembler in South Africa. 
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The impact of this new strategic orientation was very significant for many 
local Toyota suppliers. Delivery specifications became more onerous and 
relationships in the supply network had to move to approved systems. The 
price for non-compliance was the prospect of losing local Toyota business to 
other global suppliers. Some firms struggled to adjust, while others were 
willingly or unwillingly drawn into becoming local plants of multinational 
component firms. A number of firms that either did not supply Toyota or had 
Toyota as only one of a number of OEM customers faced a barrage of 
adjustment requirements to specialise, increase volumes of output and 
improve product and process standards. A few new entrants also appeared in 
response to the new policy environment. These included manufacturers of 
catalytic converters, seat cover manufacturers and electronics assemblers. 
Although most firms survived these changes, more than a handful admit to 
doing so by the barest of margins. The combined pressures that impacted on 
them, in a limited period of time, generated almost continual upheaval. It was 
in this context that studies first examined the gaps between the firms 
performance standards and what was to be expected of them in the future. 
Researchers from the Institute of Development Studies at the University of 
Sussex and the School of Development Studies at the then University of Natal 
(today the University of KwaZulu-Natal) investigated endogenous factors 
that affected the competitiveness of firms, using performance benchmarking 
techniques. With a combination of provincial government and international 
donor funding  notably from the UK's Department for International 
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Development  the KwaZulu-Natal Industrial Restructuring Project (KZN 
IRP) initiated detailed benchmarks in sectors active in the region, including 
the automotive components sector, furniture, clothing and textiles. The results 
of the studies were presented to managers in a series of participatory 
workshops. A number of automotive components producers showed 
considerable interest. In response the research team and the firms made a 
series of applications to DTIs new supply-side funds for financial support to 
sustain the benchmarking work and expand the activities of the researchers 
into more active facilitation. 
In January 1998 the KwaZulu-Natal Benchmarking Club was formally 
constituted with participation from eleven automotive component firms, 
Toyota SA, and facilitators from the KZN IRP. The Club had as its focus the 
following activities which each member would be entitled to draw on: 
! confidential scheduled diagnostic reports of firm operational 
performance and customer and supplier perceptions; 
! confidential benchmarks against a similar international competitor; 
! monthly newsletters outlining aggregated benchmark findings; 
! quarterly workshops to examine generic issues and tackle specific 
problems; 
! sharing of information between the participants. 
Research reports that resulted from the project attracted attention from the 
metropolitan government of the Durban region. Problems of long lead times 
with DTI funding mechanisms and unwieldy bureaucratic application 
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processes encouraged the KZN Benchmarking Club facilitators to explore 
links with local government officials. In 1999 the then Durban Metropolitan 
Councils Economic Development Department, motivated by a series of 
independent research reports it had commissioned into cluster potentials 
within the automotive, chemicals and textiles sectors, agreed to provide seed 
funding towards an investigation into the potential of broadening 
participation by auto sector firms in cooperative processes. The company that 
had by then been formed to carry out the facilitation and research functions 
related to the KZN Benchmarking Club, explored the potential of expanding 
both the participation and the agenda of the Club. A series of workshops with 
KZN-based automotive components and OEM firms confirmed interest from 
over twenty firms in participating in information sharing and joint action 
activities. An additional funding commitment from the Durban Metropolitan 
Council enabled the Deputy Mayor formally to launch the DAC in 2002. 
The DAC differed in a number of ways from the KZN Benchmarking Club. 
The Clubs main activity was confidentially to benchmark each member firm 
against domestic and international competitors once a year. The Club also 
shared information of how member firms responded to the key challenges 
arising from the benchmarks. This required a considerable commitment of 
time and resources on the part of the firms, and  insofar as they revealed 
sensitive information  could obviously only function with a high degree of 
trust amongst them. What the Club did not do was to focus on identifying 
competitive challenges facing its firms, let alone organise a collective response 
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to them. By contrast, the DAC did both. Similarly to the Benchmarking Club, 
it organised for its members to share information. But this was no longer 
merely horizontal. Instead it explored opportunities for vertical cooperation 
and set up institutional arrangements to involve firms from various tiers of 
the supply chain who despite differences in size, experience, international 
exposure, and strategic orientation shared an interest in a functioning and 
growing local supplier infrastructure. Membership in the DAC was open to 
any automotive firm in KZN. Many DAC members also belong to the 
Benchmarking Club. The DACs operational structure is depicted Figure 5. 
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
Each DAC programme is governed by a nominated Technical Steering 
Committee (TSC) to ensure the successful implementation of the business 
plans. Each TSC comprises senior managers from DAC participants, 
interested government officials and a facilitator from the clusters service 
provider. The four TSCs are in turn directly answerable to a DAC Executive 
comprising the four chairs of the Technical Steering Committees, three further 
automotive component manufacturer representatives including from an SME 
and a PDI- (previously disadvantaged individual) owned firm, a 
representative of each government tier providing DAC funding, a 
representative of Toyota SA and two senior facilitators from the service 
provider. 
Crucial to the early funding of the DAC was an agreement with officials 
from the local government that a firm-driven governance structure was 
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essential to secure the confidence of the participants and the sustainability of 
the initiative. Early participants voiced reservations related to their 
experiences with impractical national level cluster initiatives driven by 
government officials in conjunction with industry associations (who 
reportedly delighted in scheduling frequent meetings in Johannesburg at such  
inopportune times that no one from out of town could attend). These 
initiatives typically professed little interest in micro-level or shop-floor 
operations that firms often felt needed priority attention. While both local 
government and provincial counterparts expressed a desire for the DAC to 
take on matters such as black economic empowerment and investment 
attraction, initial funding was not made conditional on these objectives. The 
DAC Executive was in a relatively strong position in such discussions thanks 
to increasingly sourcing its own funding directly from participating firms and 
because early successes in its activities improved its credibility as a sound 
partner. Presently the DAC, having diversified its income sources and 
nurtured the maturing of its programmes areas, has begun cautiously to move 
beyond its initial focus points onto partnering with government on strategic 
initiatives such as facilitating the entrance of black owned components firms 
into the sector. 
It is worthwhile to reflect on the roles of the specific players that led to the 
formation of the DAC. The DAC was not a creation of direct and orchestrated 
government intervention as was the case elsewhere (for example the Eastern 
Cape Auto Cluster which was formed out of DTI national cluster initiatives in 
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1997/98). However, it would also be incorrect to describe the DAC as a pure 
"bottom-up" creation of the firms that had originally participated in the 
formation of the KZN Benchmarking Club. Prior to the formation of the Club, 
most firms would have been rather sceptical about the benefits of interacting 
with either government or academic audiences. However, the role played by 
the researchers in the formation of the DAC ensured that contact with 
government  in the form of the DTI  was mediated. Hence government 
appeared a benign, if perhaps at times frustratingly quirky, partner. The 
research team, acting as facilitator, ensured that the more messy aspects of the 
interaction with the DTI did not impact on the day-to-day operating of the 
Club. It was aided in this process by the nature of the funding mechanism 
which left the recipients relatively free to allocate resources where they felt 
they would be most usefully spent. The Club experience for the firms 
therefore left them more open to future engagement with government than 
they might have been had government officials got carried away with 
asserting their own agendas of what they believed were priorities for 
sustainable firm growth. 
 With regard to the formation of the DAC, the Benchmarking Club 
facilitators and participating firms had been discussing for some time the 
possibility of involving additional firms and extending their activities. Their 
cautious response to local government requests for a future partnership 
showed that they felt in a position carefully to consider the merits of any 
proposal and were not solely reliant on sourcing lucrative government grants 
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for their survival. While local government, and to a lesser degree its 
provincial counterparts, saw an opportunity to invest in a process that was 
already showing returns  and therefore had a good chance of future success 
 the firms saw an opportunity to reduce their risks in expanding their level 
of cooperation without the added threat of becoming dependent of, often 
fickle, government attention and support. 
It is also worth noting that Toyota generally took a keen interest in the 
workings and activities of the Cluster but has been very careful not to 
dominate processes. A member of its management team has been involved in 
the governance structure at the request of the other DAC members, but it 
recognised that it must not treat the DAC as its fiefdom. Many DAC members 
supply other OEMs, but with Toyota as a dominant regional customer they 
have been cautious not to rely too heavily for funding or operational support 
on the assembler. In this regard the DAC is an entity focused on component 
firms, whereas the cluster process in the Eastern Cape was for a long time 
dominated by OEMs seeking to improve relationships with their suppliers. 
Toyota participants in DAC processes have indicated that the projected 
growth in unit exports from the Durban plant (which will almost double 
output from 100 000 annually to over 180 000) will require ongoing and 
perhaps more intensive relationships between the OEM and the DAC as time 
progresses. 
 In the South African context, and perhaps on the continent more generally, 
the formation of DAC was unique. It is clear that from its origins in the early 
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meetings where a handful of firms considered research of a half dozen 
academics there has been early and sustained "buy-in" by the participating 
firms to the notion of networking and sharing information for individual and 
collective benefit. In its initial form as the KZN Benchmarking Club (which 
continues to operate as a programme within the DAC) firms essentially 
managed a self-governed process. Increasing firm contributions have 
reinforced the notion of a process that firms feel they are able to direct to meet 
their own needs. Such self-reliance, combined with demonstrated success, has 
enabled the firms to negotiate the terms of funding from various government 
entities. In sum, the DAC and the BC have placed the concerns of the 
components sector at the heart of their activities instead of seeking primarily 
to serve the interests of the OEMs. 
 The DAC process is also noteworthy for the role of its facilitators. The 
academic team and later the service company spun out of the academic 
research programme were always a neutral provider of information and 
facilitation services  the service provider has not engaged itself as a 
consultancy providing strategic or other advice to firms, other than 
benchmarks and information on sector dynamics. This enabled it to play the 
role of a trusted agent without having its agenda clouded by providing or 
needing to market specific services. Firms were thus more than usually 
willing to share information and insights. This arrangement has also kept 
overheads to a minimum for the DAC; firms are not expected to cover the 
costs of a large consulting operation or invest in elaborate value adding 
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business development services as part of the deal. This has enabled broader 
participation, especially from smaller firms. 
 Finally, government played a significant role. Although this has not always 
translated into direct participation, consistent funding with limited conditions 
has enabled the DAC to continue to expand its activities and involve more 
marginal firms. The recognition by municipal authorities that funding with 
excessively onerous conditions would limit the ability of firms to give 
direction to the process and compromise flexibility was an important element 
in the total funding-operational dynamic. By focusing on outcomes such as 
employment creation, output and export growth and improved sustainability 
of firms, especially emerging black-owned enterprises, in its funding 
mandates the municipality enabled the DAC to establish its own path to work 
towards the outcomes. A similar sensitivity to the stresses and strains and 
trust issues involved in formalising a network into an action-oriented 
collective has not always been apparent from other spheres of government. 
Reduced reliance on such sources for funding was clearly beneficial. 
 In sum, an existing spatial agglomeration in which buyers and suppliers 
interacted and made use of the labour pool around the city of Durban but 
which historically did not exhibit the sort of strong externalities normally 
associated with successful clusters, gave rise to the benchmarking and then 
the DAC initiative. Since membership was open to any automotive firms in 
KZN regardless of their distance to Durban, the cluster was inclusive or, put 
differently, did not impose a locational requirement. In practice, it looks like a 
 23
spatial agglomeration with a couple of relatively distant subscribers whose 
activities relate at least in part to the supply relationships in the core of the 
cluster in Durban. Neither the Benchmarking Club nor the DAC evolved 
spontaneously or even primarily as an initiative by concerned firms. Instead, 
the principal protagonists were associated with the municipal government 
and a local university. Hence, in the face of its peculiar evolution and its 
partially dispersed structure, the preliminary empirical answer to the 
theoretical question posed at the beginning of Section 2  How do you know a 
cluster when you see one?  is that in this case its member firms chose to call 
themselves just that. This turns attention to the question of the degree to 
which this self-styled cluster generates activities that allow it to improve 
collective performance. 
 
Cluster performance and inter-firm cooperation 
Our contention is that joint action made a noticeable difference to the 
performance of those automotive suppliers in KZN that joined the DAC and 
its forerunner, the Benchmarking Club. Put differently, while the 
longstanding agglomeration of firms in KZN is likely to have given rise to 
externalities even prior to the formation of the Club and the DAC, they cannot 
account for the improvement in firm performance since the latter part of the 
1990s. By contrast, joint action can. 
 In short, this section 
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• shows the improvement in operational competitiveness over time. 
Data are taken from the database of the Benchmarking Club. The Club 
evaluates members once a year against international competitors in 
both advanced and latecomer countries. This allows to gauge 
performance relatively as well as absolutely. 
• makes a plausible (but refutable) case that joint action is an important 
element behind this performance. Ceteris paribus, more inter-firm 
cooperation should yield better results. The challenge is to 
operationalise this. 
• tests this contention through a survey of DAC members. Many other 
factors may be responsible, individually or jointly, for the generally 
positive performance of the DAC. Notably this would include 
increased international competition and other forms of inter- or intra-
firm cooperation, for example between license partners or subsidiaries 
and multinational principals. 
 
Performance improvement in DAC 
It is easy to demonstrate that member firms have become better in a range of 
activities. Indeed, firm level data confirm that operationally much has been 
happening since the late 1990s (see Table 1). The information comprises 
competitiveness and financial performance data from over 40 automotive 
component manufacturers, including DAC members, which belong to one of 
three regional Benchmarking Clubs in KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape and 
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Gauteng provinces. In 2002, their employment ranged from under 50 to over 
2000, and turnover from Rand 11 million (USD 1 million) to Rand 1.1 billion 
(USD 11.6 million). They represent roughly 25% of the national automotive 
components industry by value. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Each member is benchmarked against an international competitor based in 
either Western or Eastern Europe, Malaysia or Australia. Thus the database 
includes information from a set of international firms, half of which in 
developing countries, that broadly match the product profile of their South 
African counterparts (see Table 2). South African based firms generally lag 
behind their competitors. Only the top performers match and indeed 
outperform their international peers. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The gains from joint action: a plausible but refutable case 
The indicators in Tables 1 and 2 measure how successfully DAC and other 
Benchmarking Club firms implement lean management practices.xxii They do 
not show what the improvement results from. One possibility is joint action. 
The DAC runs programmes in the areas of supplier development, human 
resource development, logistics, and benchmarking to advance these 
practices. Committees staffed by managers of member firms, supported by 
facilitators from the service provider, regularly meet in order to identify 
problems, discuss how to address them, disseminate their deliberations, and 
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ultimately come up with a solution. These are incidences of cooperation. In 
other words, the firms engage in joint action. 
 In an attempt to systematize this notion we separated it into two 
components, commitment and frequency. Regarding the former, it would be 
different for managers merely to attend a workshop and (passively) absorb 
information as opposed to actively seek and provide data to share with their 
peers. Low commitment by a firm means that it underwrites the (partial) cost 
of an activity but devotes no management time to it. For example, in the 
DAC's case the service provider surveys trends in the world car industry and 
summarises their implications for the regional automotive economy. This 
intelligence is distributed regularly to member firms. It creates awareness and 
potentially informs their strategic thinking, but firms have no direct input. 
High commitment means the investment of comprehensive management time 
across functions, such as the participation of senior staff in specialized work 
groups (e.g. on purchasing skills) that report to a technical steering committee 
which oversees the supplier development programme within the cluster. 
Frequency concerns how often activities or meetings take place. This goes 
from low (once in 5 months to once a year) to medium (once every 2-4 
months) to high (more than once a month). 
 In Table 3 these two parameters are combined into a composite cooperation 
index. The index weighs commitment more heavily than frequency. This is 
because a high-commitment exercise that happens once a year is worth more 
than a largely passive exercise that happens once a month. The expectation is 
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that a relatively high-value joint action would lead to more solid gains. The 
last column in Table 3 illustrates that this is indeed generally the case. For 
example, in the area of supplier development, a high-powered Technical 
Steering Committee with a busy meeting schedule, assisted by a specialised 
work group, identified purchasing skills as a key weakness and ultimately 
succeeded to institute a dedicated course aimed at training the requisite skills 
at the local technical university. Likewise, joint action with a low cooperation 
score  as pretty much all activities in the DAC's Logistics Programme  did 
yield a very tangible result, namely reduced shipping rates for DAC 
members, but this was a smaller feat than re-organizing the training 
programme in a school. Hence across the four cluster programmes it appears 
that a higher incidence of cooperation leads to more impressive results  it is 
plausible that joint action matters. But the case is not solid yet. 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Joint action, competition, and non-co-located inter-firm cooperation 
Schmitz and his team based their work on collective efficiency on the 
proposition that shocks like trade liberalization would catalyze joint action.xxiii 
Consequently they looked at whether or not the exchange of information and 
experiences, cooperation in improving quality and in speeding up delivery 
and so forth increased in the wake of an external shock. The present paper is 
clearly in the tradition of Schmitz's work. But in our case the link between 
trade liberalization and inter-firm cooperation is obvious, as is the increase in 
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the latter. Our question is if this increase has made a difference in terms of 
improving cluster performance. More formally, was the DAC instrumental in 
the acquisition, assimilation, adaptation and exploitation of information? 
 Of course, the answer could be negative. Increased competition might have 
motivated firms to become more efficient. In this case the market matters 
most, externalities some, but joint action little to nothing. Likewise, inter-firm 
cooperation may well be important but in a different sense, namely between 
license partners. In addition, knowledge transfer that ultimately manifests 
itself in more capable local adoption of lean management techniques may be 
primarily intra-firm, especially from foreign MNCs to their subsidiaries. Of 
course, global competition on the one hand and DAC activities on the other 
are different types of variables. Competition is the driver that propels firms to 
undertake (or not) some form of adjustment, and cluster activities are its 
manifestations. Joint action is unlikely in the absence of increased competition 
because there is no challenge to meet that would justify the required 
commitment of resources. At the same time, however, a firm can adjust 
primarily because of increased competition  and because it can draw on 
internal resources that allow it to do so even in the absence of joint action  or 
primarily because, given this competition, it can draw on collective resources. 
Note that especially smaller and under-resourced firms may not even be 
aware of more dynamic aspects of competition that affect them in the medium 
more so than in the short run, unless an external agency explains market 
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trends to them. For this reason it makes sense to compare the relative weight 
of the rather different factors influencing firm adjustment. 
 We explored the relative weight of these different variables in a survey of 
the managers of the DAC member firms (see questionnaire in Appendix). The 
questionnaire enquires about the importance of intelligence member firms 
receive from the business service provider, the gains they get from 
participating in DAC workshops, and if members would be able to substitute 
these services if the DAC did not exist (Questions 1-7). Question 8 asks about 
the relative import of a number of variables that individually or collectively 
could conceivably influence the performance of individual firms. 19 of 26 
targeted member firms responded.xxiv
 The results are revealing (see Table 4). On average a minimum of one in 
three managers attaches a high value to the acquisition and assimilation 
(Questions 1, 3, 4) and to the exploitation (Question 2) of knowledge made 
possible by DAC activities, and practically the entire respondent group 
assigns this at least medium significance. Interestingly, fewer managers 
benefit strategically from workshops (Question 5) than from surveys. In other 
words, external knowledge is possibly more important to dealing with the 
challenges of global supply chains than intra-cluster intelligence. The 
efficiency of joint action is not in doubt; more than nine out of ten 
respondents report that substituting cluster activtities would be expensive or 
not an option at all (Question 6). Likewise, the same number of respondents 
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are convinced of the effectiveness of cluster activities in generating 
performance improvements (Question 7). 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 The latter point can be disaggregated further (see Table 5). The single most 
important factor for achieving internationally required performance 
standards is global competition. This underlines the essential role of the DAC 
in facilitating learning about global competition reported above. In other 
words, inter-firm competition in global supply chains exerts pressure on firms 
within the cluster; and the cluster helps its members understand the nature of 
this challenge. A key factor for the "hard" performance criteria of quality and 
cost is technical assistance from foreign partners; this includes licensors as 
well as multinational investors. It is in these two areas that South African 
firms are most burdened by the legacy of import substitution and where their 
competence was most in question. It appears that DAC activities, the joint 
second and third most important factor, respectively, helped them rise to the 
challenge. 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 The situation is somewhat different with respect to the two "soft" criteria of 
flexibility and delivery. In these areas cluster activities are almost as 
important as global competition while technical assistance, on average, is not 
particularly important at all. Table 3 showed that on-time and full delivery, 
especially of the Club's top performers, was on par with international 
standards. And South African firms had always had to employ flexibility to 
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compensate for the cost disadvantages associated with small production runs. 
The managers' responses suggest that joint action has been instrumental in 
turning these "make-do" attitudes into internationally acceptable 
competences. Small and PDI-owned firms evaluate the importance of joint 
action more positively than larger firms. On balance small firms say that the 
DAC is essential while larger firms consider it merely useful. 
 The information in Table 5 also shows that inside the cluster cooperation is 
more important than competition. This will be music in the ears of cluster 
aficionados. By contrast, competition is more important than inter- or intra-
firm cooperation outside the cluster. This raises the question about the 
relative significance of alliance capitalism in developing countries or, more 
specifically, the extent to which individual subsidiaries act as conduits for 
knowledge that lends itself to technological upgrading of domestic firms. It 
would be interesting to address the nature and quality of technology-relevant 
extra-cluster links in future research. 
 
Conclusions 
Joint action matters for firm performance, at least in the case at hand. Joint 
action lowers the costs of information provision about markets, product 
standards, process requirements, and other variables that determine the 
competence with which firms confront global value chains. Joint action also 
helps firms gear up for what is, not just in the global automotive industry, a 
tough fight for a place in the sun. Cooperation-vs-competition is a 
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meaningless dichotomy. If global competition is the challenge, local 
cooperation is the efficient answer for firms that would stand little chance of 
understanding what this competition is really about, let alone facing up to 
what it asks of them. This applies to all firms in the cluster, but especially so 
to those relatively disadvantaged by small size and lack of experience in 
supplying to global value chains. 
 The success of the DAC is due to a fortuitous combination of impartial 
analysis by academics-turned-consultants whose competence and motivation 
 unlike that of most pure-bred consultants  was beyond doubt; the 
realization by firms of their own limitations along with a commitment to 
overcoming them; and a policy framework conducive to the strategies of 
multinational assemblers and component suppliers that incorporated South 
Africa into their worldwide production networks. 
 It is not easy to draw lessons from this success story for the rest of Africa. 
Perhaps the key insight from this experience is that firms in latecomer  and 
even more so in developing countries  need to learn the rules of the game 
before they get a realistic chance at play. Hence knowledge is key, and 
collective efficiencies are perhaps most effective when marshaled to provoke, 
promote, and verify learning. 
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Fig. 1. Domestic OEM sales and exports by volume 
 
SA domestic OEM sales and exports by volume: 1995 to 2002 (as reported by NAAMSA)
450,000 
400,000 
350,000 
300,000 
Units 250,000 
200,000 
150,000 
100,000 
50,000 
- 
Source: Barnes and Johnson 2004, p. 6 
 
Fig. 2. SA Automotive component output by value 
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Source: Barnes and Johnson 2004, p. 8 
Sales of omestically produced vehicles  d  373,712 
1995 
 374,758  342,535  286,159  266,349  289,333   297,856 
2001 
  279,135 
2002 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Exports   15,764  11,553   19,569   25,896   59,716   68,031   108,293   125,306 
 357,364   406,149   404,441  389,476  386,311  362,104  312,055  326,065 Total domestic production
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Fig. 4. Profile of KZN component producers by product type 
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Source: Barnes and Johnson 2004, p. 16 
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Fig. 3. Distribution of automotive component firms in KZN (2004) 
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Source: Unpublished map by F. Sokolic, UKZN, B&M Analysts 
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Figure 5.  Operational structure of the DAC 
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Table 1. Average competitiveness improvements recorded 
at Benchmarking Club members 
Indicator Unit 1999 2002 Improvement 
(%) 
     
Total inventory holding Days 51.14 40.19 21.41 
Customer return rate Ppm 4,269 1,034 75.78 
On time & in full delivery % 91.73 92.17 0.48 
Absenteeism % 4.20 3.59 14.52 
     
Source: KZN/Eastern Cape/Gauteng Benchmarking Club database 
Note: Total inventory holdings = ratio of operating days over stock 
turns per annum; customer return rate = parts per million units of 
production delivered to customers returned due to defects; on time 
and full delivery = percentage of total deliveries supplied to customers 
on time and in full; absenteeism = percentage of man days lost due to 
employees not being at work except for holiday leave 
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Table 2. Relative performance of Benchmarking Club members 
Indicator Club 
member 
average 
Club 
member 
upper 
quartile 
Developing/ 
transition 
economy 
average 
Developed 
economy 
average 
     
Total inventory 
holding 
40.19 23.00 32.81 37.30 
Customer return 
rate 
1,034 23 529.71 785.22 
On time & in full 
delivery 
92.17 98.00 96.38 91.91 
Absenteeism 3.59 2.00 4.35 5.67 
     
Source: KZN/Eastern Cape/Gauteng Benchmarking Club database 
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Table 3. Joint action in the DAC: incidence and gains 
 
INCIDENCE OF COOPERATION CCI GAINS 
Commitment (a) Frequency (b)   
    
Supplier development 
    
  
   
   
Dissemination of locally relevant global industry 
trends [LC] 
HOW OFTEN? [MF] 1.19 
 
• Launch of automotive purchasing 
course at Durban Institute of 
Technology (DIT) (with 13 enrolled 
students in first year) 
Workshops on topical supplier development 
issues [MC] 
Once every 5 weeks [HF] 2.38 
Technical Steering Committee of supplier 
development business plan [HC] 
Once every 6 weeks [HF] 4.00 
 
 
• Launch of PDI supplier development 
programme with KZN Manufacturing 
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INCIDENCE OF COOPERATION CCI GAINS 
Commitment (a) Frequency (b)   
    
Specialised work groups (purchasing skills, 
supplier development best practices, vertical 
information sharing, PDI/BEE) [HC] 
> once every 6 weeks [HF] 4.00 
  
    
    
  
 • Launch of web-based, globally marketed 
supplier data base Special interest groups (inventory and quality 
mgmt)   [HC] 
up to fortnightly [HF] 4.00 
Advisory Centre (with 6 firms in first 
run) 
 
Human resource development 
Workshops on information sharing and capacity 
building [MC] 
Once every 8 weeks [MF] 2.00 
 
• Launch of in-service training 
programme with DIT and Mangosuthu 
Technikon (with 20 enrolled students in 
first run) Investigation of joint training opportunities 
[MC] 
once a month [HF] 2.38 
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INCIDENCE OF COOPERATION CCI GAINS 
Commitment (a) Frequency (b)   
    
 
 
 
Logistics 
    
  
   
    
    
Dissemination of logistics benchmarking survey 
[LC] 
Annual [LF] 1.00 
 • Negotiation of joint in- and outbound 
shipping and air freight rates Survey of roadfreight movements in and out of 
cluster [MC] 
Once [LF] 1.68 
Workshops on information sharing [variable] Semiannual [LF] 1.00-2.83 
 
 
Benchmarking 
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INCIDENCE OF COOPERATION CCI GAINS 
Commitment (a) Frequency (b)   
    
Dissemination of Benchmarking Club 
newsletters [MC] 
Monthly [HF] 2.38 
   
    
Workshops on HRD, change mgmt, FX mgmt, 
product development [MC] 
Once every 4 months (MF] 2.00 
• Improvement in avg. operational 
competitiveness 
 
• Increase in profitability, sales, 
employment 
Note: 
• CCI = composite cooperation index. The formula used is . The weight α is set equal to 0.75. This is somewhat arbitrary but 
reflects the greater importance of commitment relative to intensity. Choosing 0.66, for example, would yield similar values, only less 
dispersed. The nice feature of this exponential function is that the minimum possible value is 1, the maximum 4, hence making for easy 
comparisons. 
ifc )1(2 αα −+=
• LC, MC, HC = low, medium, and high commitment 
o LC = firm only underwrites (partial) cost of activity (=0) 
o MC = firm dedicates select mgmt time to activity (=1) 
o HC = firm dedicates comprehensive mgmt time across functions and layers to activity (=2) 
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• LF, MF, HF = low, medium, high frequency 
o LF = once every 5-12 months (=0) 
o MF = once every 2-4 months (=1) 
o HF = more than once every 2 months (=2) 
• PDI = previously disadvantaged individuals 
• BEE = black economic empowerment 
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Table 4. Survey results (Questions 1-7): significance of learning (%) 
Question/importance Low Medium High 
    
1. importance of intelligence by DAC service provider for own 
understanding of global auto industry 
0 68 32 
2. importance of intelligence by DAC service provider for 
strategy 
5 53 42 
3. importance of DAC workshops for understanding global 
best practices 
0 47 53 
4. importance of DAC workshops for understanding cluster 
dynamics 
5 42 53 
5. importance of DAC workshops for strategy 5 74 21 
6. ease of substitutability of DAC workshops 37 58 5 
7. importance of DAC activities for improvement of 
operational competitiveness 
10 16 74 
    
Note: For Question 7, low = only own competitiveness; medium = only that of 
other DAC members; high = both. 
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Table 5. Survey results (Question 8): 
Determinants of required performance levels (mean) 
 Quality Cost Flexibility Delivery 
     
DAC activities 4.6 4.4 4.8 4.6 
Competiton from DAC members 3.7 3.3 3.7 3.5 
Competition from non-DAC 
suppliers in KZN 
2.8 2.7 2.9 3.0 
Competition from suppliers 
elsewhere in SA 
3.5 3.9 3.7 4.1 
Competition from suppliers outside 
SA 
5.4 5.5 4.9 4.9 
Technical assistance from foreign 
partners 
4.6 4.7 3.6 3.5 
Consultants 3.1 2.8 2.8 2.7 
     
Note: 1 = least important; 7 = most important. 
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 DAC 
Durban Automotive Cluster 
8 Old Main Road, Hillcrest, 3610 
PostNet Suite #10139, Private Bag X1005, Hillcrest 3650 
Tel: +27 (0) 31 765 3870 
Fax: +27 (0) 31 765 3873 
admin@bmanalysts.com 
www.dbnautocluster.org.za
 
DATE 
 
Attention:  
Managing Director 
 
 
Dear  
 
DAC PERFORMANCE QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MEMBER FIRMS 
 
Please find attached a short, two-page questionnaire that I would greatly appreciate 
you completing over the course of the next week. It is a simple questionnaire that 
requires the ticking of set responses and the provision of a few numbers. It should 
therefore not take more than 10-15 minutes to complete. Its purpose is to assess the 
relative significance of joint action in the performance improvement of cluster 
members. The Durban Automotive Cluster has been in operation now for nearly three 
years and as such we would value your input in relation to the benefits (or otherwise) 
derived. I would like to request complete honesty in relation to the completion of the 
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questionnaire, as all findings will be aggregated and then used to analyse the 
performance of the DAC. I will also be using the findings to unpack some of the 
academic lessons that can be extracted from the various activities of the DAC. If you 
feel that you are not the most appropriate person to complete the questionnaire, please 
forward it onto the necessary individual(s).  
 
If you have any queries pertaining to the questionnaire generally, as well as individual 
questions posed, please contact me directly on 082-7875608.  
 
It would be appreciated if the questionnaire could be faxed (031-7653873) back to the 
DAC’s offices by Wednesday, the 9th of June.  
 
Kindest Regards 
 
 
Justin Barnes 
Chief Facilitator 
Durban Automotive Cluster 
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 DAC 
Durban Automotive Cluster 
8 Old Main Road, Hillcrest, 3610 
PostNet Suite #10139, Private Bag X1005, Hillcrest 3650 
Tel: +27 (0) 31 765 3870 
Fax: +27 (0) 31 765 3873 
admin@bmanalysts.com 
www.dbnautocluster.org.za
 
PERFORMANCE QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MEMBER FIRMS 
 
Company: 
______________________________________________________________ 
Name of respondent: 
_____________________________________________________ 
Position in company: 
_____________________________________________________ 
Date: 
______________________________________________________________
____ 
 
1. Do the surveys you receive from the DAC (e.g. on supplier development 
issues, human resource development, logistics and benchmarking) make a 
difference to your understanding of trends (e.g. JIT, TQM, CI) in the global 
automotive industry? 
 
No, they merely confirm what we know anyway. [  ] 
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Yes, they make a small difference by complementing other sources of 
information. [  ] 
Yes, they are our single most important source of information and make a big 
difference. [  ] 
 
2. Do the insights from these surveys inform strategic thinking in your 
company? 
 
Not at all. [  ] 
A little. [  ] 
Very much. [  ] 
 
3. Do DAC workshops (e.g. on supplier development, HRD, logistics, general 
management issues, competitiveness issues) make a difference to your 
understanding of best practices in the global automotive industry? 
 
Not at all. [  ] 
A little. [  ] 
Very much. [  ] 
 
4. Do these workshops make a difference to your understanding of problems 
and competencies of cluster members and/or non-DAC KZN-based 
automotive suppliers? 
 
No, we had an equally good understanding of the local industry even before 
these workshops. [  ] 
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Yes, they contribute marginally to our understanding. [  ] 
Yes, they contribute very significantly to our understanding. [  ] 
 
5. Do discussions in these workshops inform strategic decision-making in your 
company? 
 
Not at all. [  ] 
A little. [  ] 
Very much. [  ] 
 
6. In the absence of these workshops, would you be able to get the same level 
and quality of information from other sources (such as trade magazines, 
internet sources, executive courses organized by business schools, foreign 
partners)? 
 
No. [  ] 
Yes, but only at a higher cost. [  ] 
Yes, unconditionally. [  ] 
 
7. Does your participation in activities guided by one or more of the DAC’s 
Technical Steering Committees (e.g. specialised work groups, special interest 
groups, advanced training courses) improve the operational competitiveness 
of member firms (i.e. do you learn from your peers and do they learn from 
you)? 
 
It does not improve my own or that of other member firms. [  ] 
It improves my own but not that of other member firms. [  ] 
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It improves that of other member firms but not my own. [  ] 
It improves both. [  ] 
 
8. In terms of achieving internationally required levels of quality, cost 
competitiveness, flexibility, and speed of delivery, please rank the importance 
of the following inputs (where 7 = most important and 1 = least important) 
using the entire ranking scale from 1 to 7 for each parameter: 
 
 Quality Cost Flexibility Delivery 
DAC activities     
Competition from DAC 
members 
    
Competition from non-DAC 
suppliers based in KZN 
    
Competition from non-DAC 
suppliers based elsewhere 
in South Africa 
    
Competition from suppliers 
based outside SA 
    
Technical assistance from 
foreign partners 
    
Use of consultants     
 
9. How do you feel the DAC could be improved and more effectively service 
the local auto industry? 
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Thank you for completing this questionnaire. Please return it 
via fax (031-7653873) by Wednesday, the 9th of June 2004 
                                                 
• We are grateful to Peter Møllgard, Kaushalesh Lal, Mike Morris, and Lynn 
Mytelka for helpful suggestions. 
i Porter 1990. 
ii Enright 1996; Swann and Prevezer 1998. 
iii Storper 1997; for a useful survey of the relevant literature, see Baptista 1998. 
iv Enright 1996. 
v Roelandt and den Hertog 1999. 
vi Ceglie et al. 1999. 
vii Humphrey 1995. 
viii Birkinshaw 1996; Young et al. 1994; Dunning 1993. 
ix Enright 2000. 
x Blomström and Kokko 1998; Lall 1993.  
xi Schmitz 1999. 
xii Enright 1996, 207-208; Swann and Prevezer 1998. 
xiii Roelandt and den Hertog 1999. 
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xiv Ceglie et al., 1999; for examples from Africa, see also McCormick 1999. 
xv Doeringer and Terkla 1996. 
xvi The industry comprises eight light vehicle OEMs, a number of medium and 
heavy commercial vehicle OEMs, and some 250 dedicated component 
manufacturers, many of which are MNC subsidiaries. 
xvii Joffe et al. 1995. 
xviii For an overview of policy in that period, see Black 2001. 
xix Joffe et al., 1995. 
xx Kaplinsky and Morris 1997. 
xxi Data in this section are from Barnes and Johnson 2004. 
xxii Not all DAC members are also members of the Benchmarking Club, and 
due to the relatively recent vintage of the DAC and its growing membership 
not all of those that are have been benchmarked twice, making it impossible 
to evaluate performance over time. Technically the correct procedure would 
have been for us to report performance indicators only for DAC firms. But 
this would have reduced our sample making it more vulnerable to outliers 
while not changing the underlying positive trend. Hence, our analysis of joint 
action is conservative in that it suggests that DAC firms are as least as good as 
Benchmarking Club members. This is not a heroic assumption. In future work 
and as our database expands both in terms of membership and over time, we 
aim to look for differences across the three provinces and, within KZN, 
between ordinary BC members and those that are also members of DAC. 
xxiii Schmitz 2000. 
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xxiv In mid-2004 the DAC had more than forty member firms. We only 
approached those firms that have been members since the beginning of the 
Cluster in 2002 in order to elicit more informed responses. 
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